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A View to a Kill: Perspectives on Faux-Snuff and Self 
Steve Jones 
 
To date, scholarly debate about the content of snuff-themed fiction has predominantly 
focused on two co-joining issues: realism and affect.1 That emphasis is unsurprising given 
snuff’s ontological foundations. Unlike other horror subgenres – such as the werewolf film, 
the zombie movie, the slasher flick, and torture porn – simulated snuff is not principally 
defined by its content, but rather by its realist form.2 Although pertinent then, the attention 
devoted to realism in scholarly writing about snuff has resulted in under-theorization of 
feigned snuff narratives’ symbolic meanings. 
This chapter seeks to offer one alternative interpretation of snuff-fiction’s narrative content, 
examining what the simulated snuff form reveals about self. Although largely disparaged as 
cultural trash, fabricated snuff films give voice to complex social ideas. Numerous deep-
seated fears that underpin both interpersonal interactions and self-conception are routinely 
reified as horror in these films. Moreover, snuff-fiction’s particular articulation of self 
encapsulates concerns about selfhood that are similar to those expressed in concurrent 
philosophy. That is not to suggest that the horror filmmakers in question have been directly 
influenced by recent movements in self-philosophy, but rather that the films and philosophy 
in question are products of the same climate of ideas. Fake snuff movies and philosophy 
occupy different cultural spheres and certainly utilize very different languages, yet their 
contiguity becomes apparent via their correlating visions of self. 
Here, I will address a particular form of snuff-fiction that has grown in popularity since the 
fin-de-siècle: faux-snuff. Rather than embedding snuff sequences in a broader narrative 
framework – a technique employed in Hardcore (1979, USA, dir. Paul Schrader), Cannibal 
Holocaust (1980, Italy, dir. Ruggero Deodato), and 8mm (1999, USA, dir. Joel Schumacher) 
for example – faux-snuff films such as Tumbling Doll of Flesh (aka Niku Daruma, 1998, Japan, 
dir. Tamakichi Anaru) and August Underground (2001, USA, dir. Fred Vogel) are fictional 
simulations: attempts to mimic what real snuff might look like.3 Faux-snuff is not only the 
antecedent of snuff-themed “classics” such as Cannibal Holocaust, but also of the “found 
footage” boom that followed in the wake of The Blair Witch Project’s box-office success. The 
latter has been notably succeeded by numerous fantastical, camcorder-shot pseudo-reality 
horror films such as Paranormal Activity (2007, USA, dir. Oren Peli) and Grave Encounters 
(2011, Canada, dirs. The Vicious Brothers). However, many indie horror filmmakers have 
equally latched onto the same techniques to create realistic visions of filmed murder, 
resulting in faux-snuff films such as The Great American Snuff Film (2003, USA, dir. Sean 
Tretta) and Thumb’N’It (2012, UK, dir. Paul T. T. Easter), for example. 
One particular case study will provide a focal point for this chapter: Shane Ryan’s Amateur 
Porn Star Killer series (2007-2009, USA). Ryan’s trilogy concerns a homicidal male – known 
as “Brandon” – who records, charms, has sex with, and then murders young women. The 
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three films repeat the same cycle of events. The series epitomizes the faux-snuff 
methodology, being mainly constituted by real-time, camcorder-shot footage, while 
encapsulating characteristic shifts in recent self-philosophy, which will be delineated in the 
next section. The paradigm drawn upon below is aligned with Farmer and Tsakiris’s proposal 
that self is comprised of three elements: “Bodily Social Self,” “Narrative Self,” and 
“Phenomenological Self.”4 Their unified, tripartite model summates numerous key trends 
within contemporary self-philosophy. Once established, I will delineate how this paradigm 
manifests in Amateur Porn Star Killer, exploring some of the complications that arise from 
balancing these three elements of selfhood. Finally, faux-snuff’s contribution to debates 
about selfhood will be expounded, paying particular attention to the collapse of various 
ostensibly dichotomous relationships.  
 
Theory/Self 
Traditionally, approaches to selfhood have been divisive. Arguably the most notable 
divergence has been between philosophical-theoretical approaches to self on one hand, and 
scientific/empirical approaches on the other. The “explanatory gap” debate is indicative of 
that opposition, being founded on the premise that “third-person scientific theories” fail to 
capture the “qualitative first-person experience of mental states.”5 Although some thinkers, 
such as Martin, remain skeptical about the possibility that “the self” can become a “unitary 
explanatory postulate” while disciplines lack a shared theoretical framework,6 there have 
been significant advances towards developing such unification in recent years. Butler is 
among the theorists who have sought to broach the gap by championing the legitimacy of 
“first-person descriptions of experience” alongside “third-person scientific descriptions.”7 
Dullstein (presents theory of mind itself as “an interdisciplinary debate,” involving “not only 
philosophers of different backgrounds, but also psychologists and neuroscientists.”8 
Moreover, Thomson’s belief in a future of “promiscuous miscegenation” between all 
“philosophical traditions and styles” is founded on perceiving the self as a bridging-point 
between various schools of thought.9 
Key to such bridging has been an emphasis on the body. Corporeality unifies various 
branches of neuroscience, social/cognitive/developmental psychology, phenomenology and 
philosophy of mind, bringing empirical study and theoretical discussion of self into a 
continuum.10 More specifically, the body has become a conduit for discussing the self as 
belonging in the world, divesting self of its Modernist, solipsistic connotations. In 
contemporary debate then, a Merleau-Pontian emphasis on embodiment such as Zahavi’s11 
is typically favored over Cartesian-influenced accounts of independently existent minds. 
Pace Descartes, in contemporary debate it is frequently taken for granted that embodiment 
is a prerequisite for selfhood, and that selves are intersubjective.12 Farmer and Tsakiris’s 
term “Bodily Social Self” neatly encapsulates that belief. The body situates the self in the 
world, and enables interaction with other embodied beings. Furthermore, socio-
embodiment shapes self-conception: “Bodily Social Self is based on the recognition that 
one’s own body can be the object of other’s perceptions and thus that the bodies of others 
are like one’s own.”13  
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Movement away from a Cartesian position in twentieth-century philosophy has facilitated a 
rendition of consciousness studies that evades the pitfalls of egoism.14 As Berendzen 
posits,15 the emphasis on embodiment has divested the conventional mind-body hierarchy 
of legitimacy. One result is clearer integration between materialist science and 
phenomenology. Thus Farmer and Tsakiris refer to a second strand – the Phenomenological 
Self – as operating alongside the Bodily Social Self.16 Indeed, recent discussions regarding 
internal mental states are informed by the dual roles embodiment and phenomenology play 
in understanding others,17 demonstrating that the Bodily Social Self cannot be reduced to 
behaviorism. Again, such discussion elucidates connections between analytical and 
empirical study of the self.18  
The third stand Farmer and Tsakiris identify is Narrative Self. Following the propositions of 
thinkers such as Ricoeur, MacIntyre, and Dennett, the Narrative Self is the element that 
allows one to apprehend their continued existence over time. Phenomenological 
experiences, memories and aspirations for the future are gathered together to provide the 
self with temporal and ontological stability. Again, this facet of self has been utilized across 
various disciplines. For example, Gallagher has made a case for Narrative Self’s relevance to 
a variety of empirical disciplines including neuroscience and psychiatry.19 Unsurprisingly, 
Narrative Self has also been adopted within much developmental psychology, where 
language acquisition is a key issue in theorization about self-formation.20  
Alone, the Narrative Self is clearly flawed. One’s self-narrative begins before language 
acquisition occurs. Moreover, since the “author” is not present in the instance of their own 
demise, the narrative can never be complete.21 As such, the Narrative Self cannot offer a 
comprehensive account of personal identity. A more satisfying paradigm is offered by 
joining Narrative Self with Bodily Social Self and Phenomenological Self. Indeed, Narrative 
Self enables the subject to order and reflect upon their phenomenological experiences. 
Strawson’s complaint that the “stream of consciousness” metaphor does not match actual 
experiences of being conscious22 – of interrupted, fragmented, memory-laden thought 
processes – can be usefully revised once Phenomenological Self and Narrative Self are 
combined. Narrative Self brings the experiences of the Phenomenological Self into temporal 
continuity.23 As Farmer and Tsakiris have it, the Narrative Self is “constituted through the 
stories that we and others tell about ourselves.”24 Pace Zahavi’s insistence that “the decisive 
paradigm shift…from a philosophy of subjectivity to a philosophy of language” has more 
recently “been replaced by a return to consciousness,”25 it would be more accurate to 
suggest that narrative theory has been combined with phenomenology to compensate for 
weaknesses in both.  
Narrative Self and Bodily Social Self are also symbiotic. One’s self-narrative is shaped by 
external socio-cultural factors. Although Schechtman rightly observes that autobiographical 
accounts are biased by one’s first-person perspective,26 Narrative Self is intimately 
intertwined with processes of intersubjective communication.27 Self-narration is a “social 
process” because we “co-construct” our narratives.28 Narrative Self also compensates for 
weaknesses in the Bodily Social Self model. Since the body provides continuity for one’s 
sense of self over time, it could be suggested that the self is simply material. Self-narration 
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bridges between continuity and self-conception without reducing the self to corporeality 
alone.   
Although different terms may be utilized to express their ideas, Farmer and Tsakiris’s unified 
self paradigm is shared by various theorists.29 For some theorists, unified models are either 
the product of, or are facilitating multidisciplinary engagements with self.30 This disciplinary 
fusion crucially parallels the tripartite paradigm’s main strength: amalgamating separate 
elements into a more coherent, integrated structure. Just as the “speciﬁcally modern 
conception of the self” as “fragmented” is largely rejected in contemporary debate,31 the 
interdisciplinary field of self-studies is itself becoming less fissured.   
Over the last decade, that field – encompassing philosophy, psychology and the sciences – 
has been gradually finding a shared language. Scholarly discourses are not the only means of 
articulating these ideas, however. Issues of self are also reified in culture, as the following 
dissection of Amateur Porn Star Killer will demonstrate. One aim of analyzing cultural 
representations via the language of selfhood scholarship is to bridge another disciplinary 
gap. By nature of their story-telling devices, fictional narratives are particularly apposite as a 
route into understanding Narrative Self. Fiction is communicative, and thus social. Film’s 
various elements – scripting, performance, editing, image composition, lighting, sound, and 
so forth – are forms of communication that operate in a different way to the language-
based conventions of academic work. Thus, a second objective of this approach is to evince 
how cultural representations contribute to theoretical discussion of self.  
 
Trilogy/Self 
In order to explain how self is rendered in Amateur Porn Star Killer, I return to Farmer and 
Tsakiris’s three aspects of self, beginning with Phenomenological Self. Faux-snuff is 
principally invested in killers’ first-person perspectives, and Amateur Porn Star Killer 
epitomizes that trope. The trilogy is constituted by footage captured via Brandon’s 
camcorder (killer-cam). Resultantly, the narrative events are mainly (although not 
exclusively) shot from Brandon’s point-of-view. At this basic level, much of the series’ 
duration is spent replicating a singular perspective on the world. This is a characteristic 
trope of the faux-snuff film. In this way, faux-snuff evokes the foundational problem that 
self-philosophy has sought to address since Descartes: that embodiment restricts one’s 
perceptual frame. We each experience the world from a limited, singular position.  
Despite the widespread rejection of Descartes’ dualistic approach, self-theorists remain 
fundamentally interested in the kinds of access introspective subjectivity provides to one’s 
self, and the various ways we apprehend others’ states. Phenomenology’s continued 
prominence in the field evinces theorists’ sustained fascination with inner-perspectives on 
lived experience. Indeed “ﬁrst-personal access to one’s own experiential life” is 
presupposed in any claim to selfhood.32 The same lexis (“first-person”) is employed in film 
studies to refer to the hand-held shooting technique employed in faux-snuff. Although 
complicated by various other factors (as I will demonstrate),33 this mode of camerawork 
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provides a natural bridge between film and philosophy that is a useful starting point for 
comparison.  
Some caveats are immediately necessary, however. First, it is inadequate to suggest plainly 
that first-person camera provides identificatory access to Brandon by placing the audience 
“in” his position. Like Cartesian dualism, psychoanalytically infused models – such as 
Braddock’s, which leaps between viewing positions, empathy, and identification34 – tend to 
be treated skeptically in the current intellectual climate. The identificatory paradigm has 
long been contested in reference to uses of first-person camerawork in horror film 
(particularly the slasher film),35 so those ideas will not be dwelt upon here other than to 
support rejection of the identification premise. Secondly, it is worth noting that Amateur 
Porn Star Killer’s first-person camerawork does not capture Brandon’s full 
phenomenological experience. Rather, only an audio-visual representation of Brandon’s 
viewpoint is conveyed. Without access to his other sensations, and associated qualia – his 
experiences – the film’s rendition of his Phenomenological Self is incomplete. That said, the 
faux-snuff form offers an additional compensatory gesture. Faux-snuff’s realist mode is 
partially a tactic to draw the viewer into an affective engagement.36 As with other faux-snuff 
films such as the August Underground series, Amateur Porn Star Killer blends graphic sexual 
depictions with explicit violence. Drawing on the conventions established within body 
genres, faux-snuff films frequently provoke visceral reactions from viewers, including fear, 
anger, and disgust. That is, the narrative’s mechanisms do not prompt identification with 
Brandon or the victims, but instead offers ways into interacting with the text that remain 
attuned to the viewer’s own embodied perspective. The gambit may not be successful for all 
individual viewers, but where efficacious, faux-snuff’s realist body-horror expedites 
sensational experience in compensation for Brandon’s phenomenologically evacuated first-
person perspective. 
These provisos are necessary insofar as Phenomenological Self alone is inadequate as an 
explanatory framework. The second strand – Narrative Self – fortifies and enriches the 
picture of selfhood. Being presented almost entirely from Brandon’s perspective, the 
Amateur Porn Star Killer movies are explicitly coded as Brandon’s story. Brandon provides 
the trilogy’s continuity, unlike the victims who are present (and are killed) within single 
films. Additionally, the films stand-in for Brandon’s self-narrative: the footage is explicitly 
referred to as such within the series. In Amateur Porn Star Killer 2, Brandon directly explains 
that he uses the camcorder to document his life: “[i]n 20 years I’m not going to remember 
everything, but I’m going to have it on camera…it’s nice to sit back and enjoy [your own life] 
like a movie.” Accordingly, the footage captured constitutes Brandon’s memories of his 
experiences.  
Narrativization permits the subject to organize their phenomenological experiences into 
continuity over time. The Narrative Self thereby does more than allowing the subject to 
access and reflect on sensations relative to previous and consequent happenings. Much like 
Brandon’s footage, Narrative Self provides temporal coherence, allowing the subject to 
envisage his or her experiences as unified across time. Just as the three films provide an 
increasingly detailed picture of Brandon as they develop, the Narrative Self enables the 
subject to better evaluate the significance of their actions, rather than perceiving every 
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incident in isolation. The “movie” version37 of Amateur Porn Star Killer 2 is especially 
pertinent in this regard, since its over-arching narrative is interpolated with Brandon’s 
(auto)biography: his development as a murderer. Incidents from Brandon’s past are also 
represented via camcorder footage, and are thus part of his self-narrativization schema. The 
camcorder offers a frame of significance, both capturing and preserving various 
occurrences. Delineating his homicidal history as part of Amateur Porn Star Killer 2 denotes 
that Brandon’s Narrative Self is comprised of memories in which he victimizes others.  
The Phenomenological Self’s stream of consciousness is not entirely overcome by its 
Narrative Self organization, however. Amateur Porn Star Killer 2 is still driven by a largely 
real-time depiction of seduction and murder. Segments of Brandon’s past are distinctly 
memory-like, interrupting the chronological flow at tangentially relevant moments. For 
example, after entering Brandon’s apartment, Brandon exhibits his sexual motivation by 
groping “Victim #12” (as the character is credited). She is unaware of the threat posed, and 
tells him to “be patient” while she changes outfits in his bathroom. As she dresses, Brandon 
waits, rubbing his crotch. At this point, one of his memory-footage segments intersects the 
temporal flow. The footage – labelled “Victim #2” in an onscreen caption – depicts a couple 
having sex in a car. The film returns to the narrative present when “Victim #12” returns from 
the bathroom. In this case, the interpolated memory-footage provides access to what 
appears to be Brandon’s daydreaming as he waits. His arousal in the narrative present 
manifests as a sexual incident from his kill-catalogue. The method encapsulates the 
disjointed quality of phenomenological stream of consciousness, while also evoking the 
Narrative Self’s organizational structure.  
Furthermore, since the three films are entirely constituted by Brandon’s recorded footage 
constructed (edited) together into a time-line, the films replicate the artificial, reflective 
nature of self-narrativization. The Narrative Self is constituted not by experiences, but by 
severely biased renditions of self-memory. The camcorder footage’s pastness is apt because 
narrativized reflection on the self is likewise an ex post facto mode of arranging experiences. 
It is also apposite that the footage is skewed towards Brandon’s first-person perspective, 
since Narrative Self is biased in orientation: the narrative is shaped around events the 
subject considers significant in formulating who they are at any given moment.  
The films are constituted almost exclusively by footage of sexualized murders. Amateur Porn 
Star Killer is not only about Brandon’s actions however, but also how Brandon himself is 
composed via his deeds. As a reflection of Brandon’s Narrative Self, the series’ repeated plot 
indicates that his identity is constituted by those homicides. Indeed, as a caption in Amateur 
Porn Star Killer 2 reveals, although he is most commonly referred to as Brandon, he also 
adopts the aliases Christian and John Lee. Thus, the caption identifies Brandon as “The 
Killer.”38 “Brandon” is a persona that belies the man’s identity as murderer. “The Killer” is 
only meaningful as a killer. In order to author his own autonomous meaningfulness, he must 
eradicate others. Consequently, the victims are co-authors in Brandon’s Narrative Self 
story:39 both parties are necessary to affirm “The Killer” qua killer. Although slaying is 
contra-social, it is not asocial. Even when they are harmful, sex, homicide and conversation 
– the three activities Brandon engages in during these films – are interpersonal 
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engagements. Since those relations define Brandon’s identity, Amateur Porn Star Killer 
depicts Brandon as a Bodily (contra)Social Self. 
Faux-snuff evokes many of the elements found in contemporary philosophy of self then, yet 
the tripartite model’s unity is complicated by the series’ murder-based plots. Homicide is 
dependent on a relationship between killer and victim, but the victim is eradicated during 
the engagement. That is, the victims vanish in the moment they constitute “The Killer” qua 
killer. Brandon’s identity is thus jeopardized as much as it is constituted by the engagement. 
Resultantly, Amateur Porn Star Killer centralizes not only sexual slaughter, but also 
Brandon’s compulsive drive to repeat the same murderous actions across the trilogy. In 
their own brutal fashion, these films convey that the process of self-narrativization is “an 
on-going process,”40 which “continually amends itself,”41 and so is experienced as 
“perpetual (re)begin[ning].”42  
 
Self/Perspectives 
Envisaged as a process of becoming rather than simply being, selfhood is divested of egoistic 
connotations. The self is neither fixed nor auto-constituting. Amateur Porn Star Killer’s 
prolonged first-person camerawork could be misconstrued as centralizing Brandon, but it 
more pertinently signals inadequacies with solipsistic conceptions of self. Events are 
depicted from one position when shot via killer-cam, but that technique also excludes all 
other possible perspectives. The form reifies Brandon’s contra-sociality, which culminates in 
his willingness to eradicate others. By formally omitting other viewpoints, the killer-cam 
motif reflects Brandon's failure to acknowledge selfhood's interdependent nature. Every 
individual’s subjectivity is founded on a claim to legitimacy. Brandon’s willingness to murder 
other people unambiguously exhibits his inability to perceive his victims as equal to himself. 
The emphasis placed on his first-person perspective in these films hypostatizes Brandon’s 
socio-pathology via the biased camerawork, and by associating that viewpoint with 
destructive, criminal behavior.       
The series’ first-person self-narration thereby evades lapsing into the kind of autonomy 
prizing self-realization Gergen warns against.43 As Gergen has it, even the most private 
memory is “a collectively defined action…fashioned within a complex relational history.”44 
The diegetic videos point towards such interconnectedness. Despite Brandon’s discussion of 
his camcorder footage as a personal aide memoire, the cassettes are not private per se. 
Indeed, Amateur Porn Star Killer’s closing captions assert that Brandon disseminated his 
murder videos by substituting them with tapes from more than 80 video-rental stores. As 
another caption in Amateur Porn Star Killer 2 has it, this means “all of his victims were 
exposed to the public through [sic] VHS.” His videos are expressly communal documents.  
The films undercut any sense that Brandon’s auto-documentation is simply to be construed 
as narcissistic self-bolstering by bridging to broader, collective spheres. Brandon’s self-
narrativization is more akin to the kind of reflexivity that transforms the subject into an 
object: that which is reflected upon. For Sartre, such deliberation necessitates perceiving 
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oneself as an other,45 and so is imbued with a third-personal, intersubjective sensibility. 
Since Brandon’s videos are public articles – intentionally disseminated to the populace by 
Brandon himself – a viewer other than Brandon is implied in the very making of the tapes. 
His pathologised self-filming is an example of “compensatory hyperreﬂexivity”; voluntary 
“reﬂective self-monitoring in an attempt to compensate for…diminished self-presence.”46 
Brandon’s auto-documentation exposes flaws in his self-conception that can only be 
remedied by accommodating rather than eliminating other perspectives.  
Although the films are principally relayed from Brandon’s first-person vantage point, it is 
significant that other perspectives are briefly included. These distinct deviations from the 
series’ normative mode occur at analogous junctures in each movie, taking one of three 
forms. The first occurs when Brandon hands the camera to his victims. For example, in 
Amateur Porn Star Killer 3, Brandon’s victim-to-be (Nikki) takes the camera while Brandon 
searches for his car keys. Although brief and naturalistic, shifting to the target-subject’s 
perspective draws attention to how oppressively exclusive the series’ primary filming 
position is. Switching to an alternative outlook, however fleetingly, undercuts the legitimacy 
of sovereign, egoistic selfhood. In the second type of deviation, the camera perspective is 
similarly disconnected from Brandon’s first-person viewpoint during some incidents of 
violence. Brandon puts the camera down to film himself harming Stacy in Amateur Porn Star 
Killer, for example. Although the footage is still “his,” the vantage point is uncoupled from 
Brandon’s point-of-view. Brandon’s first-person perspective is not totalizing, and so his 
filmed auto-documentation does not equate to unerring, autonomous self-possession. 
The third deviation is the most significant. In the final moments of each film, Brandon 
captures his own face on camera. In Amateur Porn Star Killer 2 and 3, these sequences last 
over a minute, representing the trilogy’s most sustained engagements with Brandon. In all 
three films, Brandon is only shown at length after the lead victim has been dispatched. This 
recurring pattern has a causal flavor, connoting that Brandon’s identity is indeed constituted 
by killing. As a process of self-narrativization, these moments allow Brandon to locate 
himself relative to the murders he commits. He is only captured as “complete” in the 
afterglow of homicide. However, it is also only at these junctures that Brandon is in need of 
completion. Eliminating his victim-to-be – who complements Brandon as a killer-to-be – 
entails divesting himself of the counterpart who brings meaning to his identity.  
One reason that murder cannot provide an adequate foundation for self-construction is 
because the act is ephemeral. Despite Brandon’s attempts to capture homicide on video, 
the murders remain transitory rather than constitutive. His attempts to preserve himself as 
killer after-the-fact are equally unsound. Homicide denotes that Brandon apprehends other 
subjects’ claims to self as insignificant compared with his own fulfilment. However, filming 
himself in this manner underscores just how equal Brandon and his victims are. Brandon 
uses the same apparatus to capture both himself and his victims. Consequently, Brandon is 
most knowable – to himself and to Amateur Porn Star Killer’s viewer – when he occupies the 
same representational field as his victims. Brandon treats his victims as subhuman objects 
while filming them. When he records his own visage on-camera, it is also as an object rather 
than as a subject. As an articulation of his socio-pathology, the camcorder footage – a 
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recording, distanced from immanent events – is apposite, since the mode inherently 
objectifies more than it subjectifies.  
In this light, it is apparent that Brandon’s attempts to self-narrate via first-person filming are 
self-abnegating. Killer-cam may principally exclude other perspectives, but the mode also 
displaces Brandon. Because he operates the camcorder, Brandon remains off-screen for the 
majority of the series’ duration. Since faux-snuff footage is explicitly located within the 
crime scene as the act unfolds, the form ostensibly provides more intimate access to filmed 
murder than other fictional forms do. However, Brandon’s semi-presence is a constant 
reminder of the viewer’s profound distance both from the action and from Brandon himself.  
Despite being the series’ core, Brandon remains tantalizingly out of the viewer’s reach. That 
ungraspable quality is apt, encapsulating why both faux-snuff and self are so fascinating. 
“Snuff” and “self” seem to indexically refer to objects, but neither snuff nor self can be 
pinned down as objects. The snuff myth is constituted not by any one single object, but 
rather a network of representations, allegations and speculations. Faux-snuff is the closest 
available iteration of that myth, and its constructed falsity attests to the unattainability of 
real snuff. Faux-snuff cannot replicate authentic snuff because there is no genuine article: 
faux-snuff hypostatizes the mythology. Self is similarly slippery. Much like Brandon, self is an 
ever-present foundational core that is simultaneously ungraspable. Brandon’s first-person 
perspective limits the viewer’s ability to perceive him. The viewing frame is inadequate to 
capture both Brandon and his perspective in a sustained fashion. This constraint 
encapsulates the essential problem that self poses for philosophers: our (in)ability to 
understand the world begins with our limited access to others and to ourselves. Based on 
such intangibility, some scholars have argued that self is an illusion.47 Much like snuff then, 
self could be read as a constructed mythology.  
Yet, such argumentation abandons self too hastily. It is not self, but rather the language of 
self that fails: like Brandon’s first-person perspective, the language of self offers a limited 
frame that is unable to provide a holistic picture. Like snuff, self is not a locatable object per 
se, but is a nexus of ideas, speculations, and discourses. It is only by apprehending the 
broader interconnections between various articulations of self that selfhood might be 
understood. This is why recent shifts towards interdisciplinary theorization are vital in 
moving away from the traditionally limited and limiting frameworks of selfhood studies. 
Precisely the same is true for our understanding of snuff.   
   
Self/Implications 
As the Amateur Porn Star Killer series illustrates, faux-snuff reflects various concerns that 
have been concurrently raised in the field of self-studies. However, this chapter has not 
sought to impose a paradigm on Amateur Porn Star Killer, to reclaim the subgenre from its 
maligned status, or to uncover some supposed “hidden truth” about faux-snuff narratives. 
The primary objective has been to demonstrate what can be gained by apprehending the 
already existent similarities between ideas conveyed via film and those expressed via 
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scholarship (outside of film studies). As proposed in the early stages of this chapter, the field 
of contemporary self-studies is notably characterized by its dissolving disciplinary divisions. 
Thomson’s Hegelian vision of a philosophy that “sublat[es] dichotomous oppositions” by 
synthesizing traditions48  succinctly encapsulates the power of combining extant ideas: 
doing so requires reimagining conventionalized assumptions. One such supposition might be 
that neuroscience experiments and textual readings of popular culture occupy entirely 
separate spheres. The ideas offered within recent self-philosophy are applicable to both, 
and so bridge between those apparently antithetical domains of thought.   
The Amateur Porn Star Killer films epitomize why faux-snuff is so apt as a contributor to that 
ethos. The trilogy routinely disturbs seemingly absolute binary oppositions, each of which 
are fundamental to self-conception. Despite reputedly portraying murder sprees in a 
manner that solely objectifies the victims and identifies with the killer, Amateur Porn Star 
Killer demonstrates that faux-snuff is principally invested in the tipping points between 
victim and killer. Homicide is not self-bolstering eradication of the Other in these movies. 
Although focused on engagements between Brandon and his victims, none of the Amateur 
Porn Star Killer films are mainly spent probing death, the victim qua victim, or the killer qua 
killer. Rather these films explore the build to homicide. As such, the trilogy is focused not on 
polarized binaries but on the infra-dichotomous states in-between life and death, victim and 
killer.  
The faux-snuff form provides a natural conduit for this kind of exploration because the form 
playfully blurs supposed dichotomies between fantasy and reality, fiction and truth. As I 
have argued elsewhere,49 faux-snuff filmmakers do not necessarily seek to trick viewers into 
believing realistic looking events are genuine. Ryan certainly does not try to obscure or quell 
skeptical reactions to the verité-style footage contained in his trilogy. Indeed, he openly 
provokes such incredulity from the series’ outset. Amateur Porn Star Killer opens with 
captions that proclaim snuff’s inauthenticity. These statements include Hardcore director 
Paul Schrader’s comments regarding the public’s “willingness to believe” in snuff, and a 
declaration that snuff remains an “urban legend.” All three films contain credit sequences, 
exposing their artifice. The second film was packaged on DVD in two edits (a “snuff” cut and 
a “movie” version), and the trilogy was later released in 3D.50 These formal interventions 
underline that the films are contrived, edited, commercial products. Although no genuine 
snuff has been proven to exist, faux-snuff remains powerful because its mechanisms 
underscore a truth about self. The idea that individuals might film, sell or consume murder 
for entertainment, profit or sexual gratification summates the human capacity for contra-
sociality. Faux-snuff is horrifying not because the footage looks realistic, but because its 
apparent authenticity is a reminder of how real human cruelty is. The snuff myth may have 
been articulated in many different forms, but it retains its impact precisely because contra-
sociality is so at odds with the inter-subjectivity on which selfhood is founded.  
Moreover, faux-snuff’s playful approach to authenticity is potent precisely because “truths” 
are products of inter-subjectivity. Absolute truths are unattainable because humans have no 
access to objectivity. Our viewpoints are necessarily limited and subjective because humans 
are embodied. “Truths” are formed when enough individuals concur on specific points. 
Consequently, as Gergen observes, “knowledge of the world and self finds its origins in 
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human relationships,” because beliefs are “brought into being through historically and 
culturally situated social processes.”51 Cultural objects are thus part of a truth-making 
process. In the case of faux-snuff, several “truths” are created. First, as a representation of 
human interaction, faux-snuff communicates a “truth” about human relationships, probing 
how complex intersubjectivity is. Second, faux-snuff perpetuates a false truth: that genuine 
snuff exists. That is, the extant idea that snuff is being manufactured is bolstered by the film, 
which perpetuates the notion that snuff is plausible. Indeed, “snuff” only exists as a 
nebulous human discourse: the myth is constituted by inter-subjective truth-making alone. 
Third, one of the “culturally situated social processes” Gergen refers to is reified by bridging 
between snuff and self-studies. The two might be thought of as incompatible because the 
former is typically perceived as culturally inferior to the latter. Historically, scholarly 
proclamations have been treated as offering “truths” that are more legitimate than those 
offered by, for example, fiction films. When both are perceived as inter-subjective 
agreements – communication processes –that hierarchical distinction is exposed as being 
somewhat arbitrary.     
Although filmmakers and philosophers may utilize significantly different languages, to 
ignore the similarities between the ideas and themes raised in those respective forms of 
communication is tantamount to wilful negligence. The separation between scholarship 
about self and representations of selves is comparable to the Cartesian split between mind 
and body: scholarship and the sciences have been traditionally associated with the mind, 
while popular culture (and the arts more generally) have been perceived as being of the 
body and the audio-visual senses. That hierarchical relationship is as flawed as the dualistic 
premise the difference is founded on.  
Faux-snuff offers numerous reasons for spanning established disciplinary and cultural 
divisions. The “truth” constructed around snuff is that of a base, deviant, unjustifiable mode 
of filmmaking: a cultural product that represents human interaction at its worst. As I have 
demonstrated in this chapter, such denigration is myopic. Those who wish to territorialise 
self-studies might consider it irreverent to bridge between the “lowest of the low” and the 
heights of current intellectual understanding. However, much stands to be gained from 
collapsing the conventional dichotomies that separate disciplines and investigating the 




Originally published in:    
Jackson, N., Kimber, S., Walker, J. and Watson, T. (eds.) Snuff: Real Death and Screen Media.  
New York: Bloomsbury. 





Alsmith, Adrian, John Tetteh, and Frédérique de Vignemont. “Embodying the Mind and 
Representing the Body.” Review of Philosophy and Psychology 3, no. 1 (2012): 1-13. 
Berendzen, J. C. “Coping without Foundations: On Dreyfus's Use of Merleau-Ponty.” 
International Journal of Philosophical Studies 18, no. 5 (2010): 629-49. 
Black, Joel. “Real(ist) Horror: From Execution Videos to Snuff Films.” In Underground USA: 
Filmmaking Beyond the Hollywood Canon, edited by Xavier Mendik and Steven Jay 
Schneider, 63-75. New York: Columbia University Press, 2012. 
Braddock, Louise. “Psychological Identification, Imagination and Psychoanalysis.” 
Philosophical Psychology 24, no. 5 (2011): 639-57. 
Butler, Jesse. “Introspective Knowledge of Experience and its Role in Consciousness 
Studies.” Journal of Consciousness Studies 18, no. 2 (2011): 128-45. 
Currie, Gregory. Image and Mind: Film, Philosophy and Cognitive Science.  Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1995. 
Dubrovskii, D. I. “Subjective Reality and the Brain: An Essay on a Theoretical Solution to the 
Problem.” Herald of the Russian Academy of Sciences 83, no. 1 (2013): 59-69. 
Dullstein, Monika. “The Second Person in the Theory of Mind Debate.” Review of Philosophy 
and Psychology 3, no. 2 (2012): 231-48. 
Farmer, Harry, and Manos Tsakiris. “The Bodily Social Self: A Link between Phenomenal and 
Narrative Selfhood.” Review of Philosophy and Psychology 3, no. 1 (2012): 125-44. 
Gallagher, Shaun. “Philosophical Conceptions of the Self: Implications for Cognitive Science.” 
Trends in Cognitive Science 4, no. 1 (2000): 14-21. 
Gallese, V., and C. Sinigaglia. “How the Body in Action Shapes the Self.” Journal of 
Consciousness Studies 18, no. 7-8 (2011): 117-43. 
Gergen, Kenneth J. “The Self as Social Construction.” Psychological Studies 56, no. 1 (2011): 
108-16. 
Goldman, Alvin I. “A Moderate Approach to Embodied Cognitive Science.” Review of 
Philosophy and Psychology 3, no. 1 (2012): 71-88. 
Hanna, Robert, Gerald Izenberg, Raymond Martin, Norbert Wiley, and Jerrold Seigel. “Me, 
Myself, and I: The Rise of the Modern Self.” Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences 
1234, no. 10 (2011): 108-20. 
Herbert, Beate M., and Olga  Pollatos. “The Body in the Mind: On the Relationship between 
Interoception and Embodiment.” Topics in Cognitive Science 4, no. 4 (2012): 692-704. 
Originally published in:    
Jackson, N., Kimber, S., Walker, J. and Watson, T. (eds.) Snuff: Real Death and Screen Media.  
New York: Bloomsbury. 




Hutchings, Peter. The Horror Film.  Harlow: Pearson, 2004. 
Johnstone, A. A. “The Basic Self and its Doubles.” Journal of Consciousness Studies 18, no. 7-
8 (2011): 169-95. 
Jolles, Marjorie. “Between Embodied Subjects and Objects: Narrative Somaesthetics.” 
Hypatia 27, no. 2 (2012): 301-18. 
Jones, Steve “Dying to Be Seen: Snuff-Fiction’s Problematic Fantasises of ‘Reality’.” Scope 19 
(2011). 
Jones, Steve. Torture Porn: Popular Horror after Saw. Basingstoke: Palgrave-Macmillan, 
2013. 
Lumsden, David. “Whole Life Narratives and the Self.” Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 
20, no. 1 (2013): 1-10. 
McNeill, W.E.S. “Embodiment and the Perceptual Hypothesis.” The Philosophical Quarterly 
62, no. 248 (2012): 569-91. 
Pauen, M. “Materialism, Metaphysics, and the Intuition of Distinctness.” Journal of 
Consciousness Studies 18, no. 7-8 (2011): 71-98. 
Petley, Julian “Cannibal Holocaust and the Pornography of Death.” In The Spectacle of the 
Real: From Hollywood to Reality TV and Beyond, edited by Geoff King, 173-86. Bristol: 
Intellect, 2005. 
Pfeifer, Jennifer H., and Shannon J. Peake. “Self-Development: Integrating Cognitive, 
Socioemotional, and Neuroimaging Perspectives.” Developmental Cognitive Neuroscience 2, 
no. 1 (2012): 55-69. 
Pineda, Jaime A. “Sensorimotor Cortex as a Critical Component of an 'Extended' Mirror 
Neuron System: Does It Solve the Development, Correspondence, and Control Problems in 
Mirroring?” Behavioral and Brain Functions 4, no. 47 (2008). 
Pinedo, Isabel Cristina. Recreational Terror: Women and the Pleasures of Horror Film 
Viewing.  Albany: University of New York Press, 1997. 
Prebble, Sally, Donna Addis, and Lynette Tippett. “Autobiographical Memory and Sense of 
Self.” Psychological Bulletin 139, no. 4 (2013): 815-40. 
Sartre, Jean-Paul. The Transcendence of the Ego: An Existentialist Theory of Consciousness.  
New York: The Noonday Press, 1957. 
Schechtman, Marya. “Memory and Identity.” Philosophical Studies 153, no. 1 (2011): 65-79. 
Originally published in:    
Jackson, N., Kimber, S., Walker, J. and Watson, T. (eds.) Snuff: Real Death and Screen Media.  
New York: Bloomsbury. 




Singer, Jefferson A., Pavel Blagov, Meredith Berry, and Kathryn M. Oost. “Self-Deﬁning 
Memories, Scripts, and the Life Story: Narrative Identity in Personality and Psychotherapy.” 
Journal of Personality 81, no. 6 (2013): 569-82. 
Smith, John Devlin. “Self-Concept: Autopoiesis as the Basis for a Conceptual Framework.” 
Systems Research and Behavioral Science 31, no. 1 (2014): 32-46. 
Smithies, Declan. “The Signiﬁcance of Cognitive Phenomenology.” Philosophy Compass 8, 
no. 8 (2013): 731-43. 
Strawson, Galen. Selves: An Essay in Revisionary Metaphysics.  Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2009. 
Tekin, Erife. “How Does the Self Adjudicate Narratives?” Philosophy, Psychiatry, & 
Psychology 20, no. 1 (2013): 25-28. 
Thomson, Iain. “In the Future Philosophy Will Be Neither Continental nor Analytic but 
Synthetic: Toward a Promiscuous Miscegenation of (All) Philosophical Traditions and Styles.” 
The Southern Journal of Philosophy 50, no. 2 (2012): 191-205. 
Tippett, Krista, Thomas Metzinger, Evan Thompson, and Pim van Lommel. “To Be or Not to 
Be: The Self as Illusion.” Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences 1234, no. 1 (2011): 5-
18. 
Zahavi, Dan. Subjectivity and Selfhood: Investigating the First-Person Perspective.  London: 
MIT Press, 2005. 
 
                                                          
1 See, for example, Joel Black, “Real(ist) Horror: From Execution Videos to Snuff Films,” in 
Underground USA: Filmmaking Beyond the Hollywood Canon, edited by Xavier Mendik and 
Steven Jay Schneider (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012); Isabel Cristina Pinedo, 
Recreational Terror: Women and the Pleasures of Horror Film Viewing (Albany: University of 
New York Press, 1997): 64. 
2 It is noted that snuff-themed films do share broad thematic, situational and character 
tropes. However, simulated snuff films are foremost recognizable as faux-snuff by their 
realist aesthetics. 
3 It is acknowledged that no genuine snuff movie has ever been found, and thus faux-snuff is 
a fiction based on a myth; see Julian Petley, “Cannibal Holocaust and the Pornography of 
Death,” in The Spectacle of the Real: From Hollywood to Reality TV and Beyond, edited by 
Geoff King, (Bristol: Intellect, 2005): 173. For a detailed discussion of the differences 
between faux-snuff and conventional narrative films that contain snuff sequences, see Steve 
Jones, “Dying to Be Seen: Snuff-Fiction’s Problematic Fantasises of ‘Reality’,” Scope 19 
(2011). 
Originally published in:    
Jackson, N., Kimber, S., Walker, J. and Watson, T. (eds.) Snuff: Real Death and Screen Media.  
New York: Bloomsbury. 




                                                                                                                                                                                    
4 Harry Farmer and Manos Tsakiris, “The Bodily Social Self: A Link between Phenomenal and 
Narrative Selfhood,” Review of Philosophy and Psychology 3, no. 1 (2012): 125-44. 
5 M. Pauen, “Materialism, Metaphysics, and the Intuition of Distinctness,” Journal of 
Consciousness Studies 18, no. 7-8 (2011): 71; see also Declan Smithies, “The Signiﬁcance of 
Cognitive Phenomenology,” Philosophy Compass 8, no. 8 (2013): 734-737. 
6 Robert Hanna, Gerald Izenberg, Raymond Martin, Norbert Wiley, and Jerrold Seigel, “Me, 
Myself, and I: The Rise of the Modern Self,” Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences 
1234, no. 10 (2011): 118. 
7 Jesse Butler, “Introspective Knowledge of Experience and its Role in Consciousness 
Studies,” Journal of Consciousness Studies 18, no. 2 (2011): 143. 
8 Monika Dullstein, “The Second Person in the Theory of Mind Debate,” Review of 
Philosophy and Psychology 3, no. 2 (2012): 233. See also D. I. Dubrovskii, “Subjective Reality 
and the Brain: An Essay on a Theoretical Solution to the Problem,” Herald of the Russian 
Academy of Sciences 83, no. 1 (2013): 59-60. 
9 Iain Thomson, “In the Future Philosophy Will Be Neither Continental nor Analytic but 
Synthetic: Toward a Promiscuous Miscegenation of (All) Philosophical Traditions and Styles,” 
The Southern Journal of Philosophy 50, no. 2 (2012): 191. 
10 See Adrian Alsmith, John Tetteh, and Frédérique de Vignemont. “Embodying the Mind 
and Representing the Body,” Review of Philosophy and Psychology 3, no. 1 (2012): 2; Beate 
M. Herbert and Olga Pollatos, “The Body in the Mind: On the Relationship between 
Interoception and Embodiment,” Topics in Cognitive Science 4, no. 4 (2012): 693; J. C. 
Berendzen, “Coping without Foundations: On Dreyfus's Use of Merleau-Ponty,” 
International Journal of Philosophical Studies 18, no. 5 (2010): 637. 
11 Dan Zahavi, Subjectivity and Selfhood: Investigating the First-Person Perspective (London: 
MIT Press, 2005): 159. 
12 See A. A. Johnstone, “The Basic Self and its Doubles,” Journal of Consciousness Studies 18, 
no. 7-8 (2011): 176-7; V. Gallese and C. Sinigaglia, “How the Body in Action Shapes the Self,” 
Journal of Consciousness Studies 18, no. 7-8 (2011): 135; Alvin I. Goldman, “A Moderate 
Approach to Embodied Cognitive Science,” Review of Philosophy and Psychology 3, no. 1 
(2012): 71. 
13 Farmer and Tsakiris, “The Bodily Social Self,” 128. 
14 See Zahavi, Subjectivity and Selfhood, 100. 
15 Berendzen, “Coping without Foundations.” 629. 
16 Farmer and Tsakiris, “The Bodily Social Self,” 126. 
Originally published in:    
Jackson, N., Kimber, S., Walker, J. and Watson, T. (eds.) Snuff: Real Death and Screen Media.  
New York: Bloomsbury. 




                                                                                                                                                                                    
17 See Herbert and Pollatos, “The Body in the Mind,” 696; W.E.S. McNeill, “Embodiment and 
the Perceptual Hypothesis,” The Philosophical Quarterly 62, no. 248 (2012): 573; Jaime A. 
Pineda, “Sensorimotor Cortex as a Critical Component of an 'Extended' Mirror Neuron 
System: Does It Solve the Development, Correspondence, and Control Problems in 
Mirroring?” Behavioral and Brain Functions 4, no. 47 (2008). 
18 See Zahavi, Subjectivity and Selfhood, 177; Pauen, “Materialism, Metaphysics, and the 
Intuition of Distinctness,” 85. 
19 Shaun Gallagher, “Philosophical Conceptions of the Self: Implications for Cognitive 
Science,” Trends in Cognitive Science 4, no. 1 (2000). See also Sally Prebble, Donna Addis, 
and Lynette Tippett, “Autobiographical Memory and Sense of Self,” Psychological Bulletin 
139, no. 4 (2013); Butler, “Introspective Knowledge of Experience and its Role in 
Consciousness Studies,” 138. 
20 See Kenneth J. Gergen, “The Self as Social Construction,” Psychological Studies 56, no. 1 
(2011): 111. 
21 See David Lumsden, “Whole Life Narratives and the Self,” Philosophy, Psychiatry, & 
Psychology 20, no. 1 (2013). 
22 Galen Strawson, Selves: An Essay in Revisionary Metaphysics (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2009): 139. 
23 For an interesting variation on this approach see John Devlin Smith, “Self-Concept: 
Autopoiesis as the Basis for a Conceptual Framework,” Systems Research and Behavioral 
Science 31, no. 1 (2014). 
24 Farmer and Tsakiris, “The Bodily Social Self,” 125. 
25 Zahavi, Subjectivity and Selfhood, 147-148. 
26 Marya Schechtman, “Memory and Identity,” Philosophical Studies 153, no. 1 (2011): 70. 
27 See Marjorie Jolles, “Between Embodied Subjects and Objects: Narrative Somaesthetics,” 
Hypatia 27, no. 2 (2012): 309-11; Gallagher, “Philosophical Conceptions of the Self.” 
28 Dullstein, “The Second Person in the Theory of Mind Debate,” 246-7; see also Erife Tekin, 
“How Does the Self Adjudicate Narratives?” Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 20, no. 1 
(2013): 27; Zahavi, Subjectivity and Selfhood, 108-9. 
29 Including Johnstone, “The Basic Self and its Doubles,” 182; Butler, “Introspective 
Knowledge of Experience and its Role in Consciousness Studies,” 132; Jennifer H. Pfeifer and 
Shannon J. Peake, “Self-Development: Integrating Cognitive, Socioemotional, and 
Neuroimaging Perspectives,” Developmental Cognitive Neuroscience 2, no. 1 (2012): 55. 
Originally published in:    
Jackson, N., Kimber, S., Walker, J. and Watson, T. (eds.) Snuff: Real Death and Screen Media.  
New York: Bloomsbury. 




                                                                                                                                                                                    
30 See Hanna et al. “Me, Myself, and I,” 119; Thompson in Krista Tippett, Thomas Metzinger, 
Evan Thompson, and Pim van Lommel, “To Be or Not to Be: The Self as Illusion,” Annals of 
the New York Academy of Sciences 1234, no. 1 (2011): 8. 
31 Hanna et al. “Me, Myself, and I,” 114. 
32 Zahavi, Subjectivity and Selfhood, 12-14; see also Farmer and Tsakiris, “The Bodily Social 
Self,” 129. 
33 There are budgetary advantages to shooting in an “amateur” style and utilizing widely 
available home-video cameras, especially for independent filmmakers. For example, Shane 
Ryan claims that the budget for Amateur Porn Star Killer was $45 in total. For a detailed 
discussion of micro-budget faux-snuff and its “underground”, anti-mainstream 
connotations, see Steve Jones, Torture Porn: Popular Horror after Saw (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave-Macmillan, 2013): 171-8. 
34 Louise Braddock, “Psychological Identification, Imagination and Psychoanalysis,” 
Philosophical Psychology 24, no. 5 (2011): 3. 
35 For example, see Gregory Currie, Image and Mind: Film, Philosophy and Cognitive Science 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995): 174-5; Peter Hutchings, The Horror Film 
(Harlow: Pearson, 2004): 195-6. 
36 See Jones, “Dying to Be Seen”. 
37 Amateur Porn Star Killer 2 was released in two formats: the “snuff” version and the 
“movie” version. The latter is intersected with captions outlining Brandon’s history, and 
footage of previous kills. The film also contains an extra-diegetic score and post-production 
effects (such as colored filters) not present in the snuff cut (which instead pertains to faux-
snuff realism). As such, the two versions offer a bridge between faux-snuff and conventional 
narrative films that contain snuff themes (rather than seeking to emulate snuff). All 
references to Amateur Porn Star Killer 2 in this chapter will refer to the “movie” version.  
38 Although it is revealed that the Killer’s birth name is Reid at the close of Amateur Porn 
Star Killer 2, the film’s final caption subsequently refers to the Killer as Brandon, signaling 
that Brandon remains the primary name by which the Killer is known in the series. 
39 It is also worth noting that the actors playing lead victims in the first two films (Michiko 
Jiminez and Kai Lanette respectively) are credited as co-writers and co-directors alongside 
Shane Ryan (who plays Brandon): that is, the victims are co-authors in a meta-sense. 
40 Metzinger in Tippett et al. “To Be or Not to Be,” 6. 
41 Jefferson A. Singer, Pavel Blagov, Meredith Berry, and Kathryn M. Oost, “Self-Deﬁning 
Memories, Scripts, and the Life Story: Narrative Identity in Personality and Psychotherapy,” 
Journal of Personality 81, no. 6 (2013): 570. 
Originally published in:    
Jackson, N., Kimber, S., Walker, J. and Watson, T. (eds.) Snuff: Real Death and Screen Media.  
New York: Bloomsbury. 




                                                                                                                                                                                    
42 Thomson, “In the Future Philosophy Will Be Neither Continental nor Analytic but 
Synthetic,” 194. 
43 Gergen, “The Self as Social Construction,” 112. 
44 Ibid. 114. 
45 Jean-Paul Sartre, The Transcendence of the Ego: An Existentialist Theory of Consciousness 
(New York: The Noonday Press, 1957): 65. 
46 Zahavi, Subjectivity and Selfhood, 137. 
47 See Tippett et al. “To Be or Not to Be.” 
48 Thomson, “In the Future Philosophy Will Be Neither Continental nor Analytic but 
Synthetic,” 191. 
49 Jones, “Dying to Be Seen.” 
50 Cinema Epoch released the double disc version of Amateur Porn Star Killer 2 in 2008. 
Mongolian Barbeque released the 3D trilogy DVD in 2012. 
51 Gergen, “The Self as Social Construction,”109. 
